Sergei Karaganov: The U.S. Proposal is a trap

On 6 February, U.S. President Donald Trump said that, contrary to French President Emmanuel Macron, he would like denuclearization, and that he expected to start negotiations on it with Russia and China. However, Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov said that “there have been no concrete negotiations on arms control between the Russian Federation and the United States, and there is no understanding as to when or where they will begin.” Political scientist and economist Sergei Karaganov explains why denuclearization is not desirable.

On 5 March, French President Emmanuel Macron declared Russia a threat to France and Europe, and called for discussing the use of France’s nuclear weapons to protect the EU, noting that the U.S. had changed its position on Ukraine and on its own leading role in NATO.

Responding to a question about Macron’s initiative, President Trump said that he would like the “opposite,” namely nuclear arms reduction, and was hoping to discuss this with Russia and China.
The Federation of American Scientists has calculated that nine countries together possess 12,000 nuclear warheads, the total having increased over the past 40 years by 700, due to growth in the arsenals of China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. Russia tops the list with 5,580 warheads, followed by the U.S. with 5,044.

Moskovsky Komsomolets asked renowned Russian political scientist and economist Sergei Karaganov to explain the situation.

– If nuclear weapons are to be reduced, then this should probably be done by all nuclear-armed states, not just by Russia and China, which the U.S. National Strategy designates as adversaries?

– Such proposals, which I have heard from American strategists and experts for decades, only make me smile or smirk. The U.S.—with its technological, economic, and military preponderance, with its still-powerful conventional forces (especially the navy), and with an advantage in space—has an interest in reducing nuclear weapons. They make the U.S.’s colossal investments in other military spheres pointless, and nullify its economic, technological, and demographic advantages vis-à-vis Russia. By drawing us into trilateral or even multilateral negotiations, the Americans would like to drive a wedge in our relations with friendly China.

Many in our country believe that the fewer nuclear weapons, the better. But this is imported from U.S. strategic thinking. We don’t need an excess of nuclear arms, of course, but we do need enough so that no one would ever think about starting a war against Russia or its closest allies, or about a major war at all.

At some point in history, we ourselves forgot about the many functions of nuclear deterrence, which is needed for preventing not only nuclear aggression, but also any war. It nullifies any advantages―demographic, economic, or military-technological―of the enemy.

We have just seen how, by failing to use nuclear deterrence at the very beginning of the armed conflict, we got what we got in Ukraine.

But, thanks to God, or our expert community, we have finally activated our nuclear deterrence capabilities, amended the nuclear doctrine, and begun, although not vigorously enough, to move up the the so-called ladder of nuclear deterrence.’

– What is behind these amendments to the nuclear doctrine?

– At the beginning of last summer, a discussion began about the need to increase reliance on nuclear deterrence, and we eventually did amend our nuclear doctrine, and climbed several steps up the nuclear deterrence escalation ladder. This convinced our opponents of our readiness to use nuclear weapons, if desperately needed. Further continuation of the war threatened to lead the Americans into a situation where they are deprived of the possibility to rely on their economic and other advantages. Either they would suffer a shameful defeat, or they would see nuclear strikes against their allies and their own foreign military bases. At first, they said that Russia would never use nuclear weapons, and therefore they could continue the war to the last Ukrainian, until Russia was exhausted. Then, having received signals from Russia, they stopped saying that, and started talking about the need to avoid World War III and stop the escalation. The U.S. had come to this understanding by the end of Biden’s term, although just before the end, Biden tried to force a continuation of the war, and responsibility for it and the associated failure, onto the next administration. Trump did not fall into this trap, he simply resumed the U.S.’s exit from the lost war.

I regret that we did not activate the mechanism of nuclear deterrence earlier, then we would have achieved victory faster.

– So the situation changed even under Biden?

– Yes, the Americans realized that they could not win this war. We are restoring our economic and military-technical potential, but still lag behind demographically and economically. This is why we have placed emphasis on nuclear deterrence, which should prevent any war, making it unlikely and impermissibly costly for the aggressor.

We can discuss limiting some types of weapons, for example, biological ones, which are now being widely developed, space weapons, or long-range missiles and drones, which will increasingly threaten people’s normal life. The technological revolution that has made missiles and drones so cheap creates enormous risk for human beings. In fact, terrorists could also use them.

But nuclear weapons cannot be reduced under any circumstances. We should remember that there are a lot of people here in Russia who were brought up within the American ideological framework, who support any disarmament and will take Trump’s words at face value. But these words are mere trickery. It’s a trap, an attempt to repeat Reagan’s trick with Mikhail Gorbachev, who was а nice person but a bit simple. So, I hope that our American opponents (and, hopefully, partners in the future) understand that there can be no positive response to their proposal.

– Are Europeans afraid of nuclear conflict?

– One of the unfortunate consequences of the relatively peaceful period that began in the early 1960s—although there were local, peripheral conflicts—is the loss of the fear of nuclear war. Until very recently, the Americans deliberately spread the view that it’s not so terrible. Nuclear parasitism―the absence of the self-preserving fear of war―has taken its deepest roots in Europe.

We need to use nuclear deterrence so that the Europeans go away as far and as soon as possible. Or defeat them completely.

– Is French President Emmanuel Macron’s proposed nuclear umbrella for Europe realistic?

– I will not insult a once-great country. But the idea of extending the French nuclear umbrella onto other countries is utterly laughable. I have written many times, and American experts have never disagreed, that the United States will under no circumstances use nuclear weapons against Russia in the event of war in Europe. It’s an axiom. The American nuclear doctrine foresees their use, but this is a total bluff. What Macron says is stupidity that humiliates the great country of France.

I have written and said many times that no American president, unless he is crazy or hates America, will use nuclear weapons “in defense” of hypothetical Poznan, thus risking Boston.

Will the French president put Paris under attack for the sake of Berlin? It seems to be time for the French “deep state” and French people to clear their leadership of idiots. And by the way, no one is going to attack Europe. We are responding to NATO’s many years of military-political aggression. The best way to ensure European security is to respect Russia’s interests and even be friends with it. But the pygmies governing Europe right now are unable to understand this. It’s time to replace them or defeat them.