The current crisis in Russia-West relations is commonly blamed on Russia’s actions in Crimea, Donbass and Ukraine in general. But its roots go much deeper. And it may have much more serious consequences in the long term. The situation may not only evolve into a full-blown armed clash, the probability of which I hope is declining, political confrontation or truncated economic ties. But it may also lead to a social and civilizational “divorce” between Russia and Europe, which would endanger all Europeans.
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But I am more concerned about its possible impact on Russia, for it may imperil a key element of identity for the majority of Russians. Even when we criticized Europe or were at war with some of its countries, we considered ourselves part of the European civilization. We received modernization impulses both in technology and, quite importantly, in everyday and social life from what we commonly call Europe. Christianity came to us from Byzantium, the forefront of Europe at that time. We obtained ancient statehood from the Vikings and shaped our modern statehood through reforms started by Peter the Great and continued by Catherine the Great and through the unprecedented openness of the Russian people when we invited over and established kin relationships with the European nobility and meritocracy – engineers, scholars and members of the military.
Today, many of Russians blame the West for the failure of our reforms even though the fault lies more with our elites, poorly educated but impatient.
And yet the West must take a fair share of this blame for carrying out a neo-Versailles policy after the self-dissolution of the Soviet Union, continuously pushing Russia out of political and economic markets and trying to establish political and military control over territories which were crucial for Russian national security and which had cost it millions of lives. When it came to Ukraine, a war predictably broke out, a small-scale one so far. The West did not help when it could. As I understand Russia was the only one among former socialist countries that did not get even a part of its past debts forgiven. This is one of the reasons why Russia’s post-Soviet transformation was so difficult, and left most Russians deeply frustrated with the ideas of liberalism, democracy and integration with the West. But Russians, too, bear their share of responsibility for the senseless disintegration of the Soviet Union, for the weakness of the elites and their desire to please the West, which only whet its appetite.
Now that things did not work out with Europe, Russia has dashed to Asia. Notwithstanding possible reproaches for harboring anti-European views, for many years I advocated a long overdue economic turn towards rising Asia. A turn has begun at last recently, albeit hesitantly, but has been followed almost immediately by a full geopolitical thrust in the same direction. It can bring both big gains and unavoidable losses, especially if done in haste. A big part of the Russian elite seems to be hurt and has decided to turn away from Europe. Alexander Blok’s poem “Scythians” sounds as contemporary today as a hundred years ago when it was written.
The urge, quite legitimate if not belated, for Russia’s strong action in the Ukraine crisis to teach Western partners to respect its interests it considers vital goes along with a less attractive motive. In all appearances, the Russian elite being unable to offer a viable program of economic development and is now trying to cover up its failure with confrontation or whip itself and society with it into drafting and launching such program. Confrontation is there, but the program is not.
The current turn from Europe may be more profound than that in Soviet times. But Russia’s action or inaction is not the main reason.
Russian and European elites vowed for a long time, quite sincerely for the most part, that they shared the same values. But they failed to notice that the values professed by the majority of Russians and European elites and societies in general had been diverging over the last couple decades. In Russia, the majority of people and elites were gravitating towards state nationalism as opposed to communist messianic internationalism, towards Christianity and other traditional, essentially old European, values that had been taken away from them in Soviet times. Europeans, on the contrary, were abandoning them. And now we are no closer to each other than twenty-five years ago. We may come together again some time, but no one knows whether this can happen and when.
Integration with Europe, dreamed of by Russian pro-Western intellectuals and quite challenging a quarter of century ago, is even more so now that our values have drifted father apart, albeit in other areas than before. The majority of people have received what they strived for – well-stocked shops and personal freedoms as in Europe. The rule of law or mature democracy is not their immediate concern. It may take decades or even generations for them to demand or build it.
The root cause of the current crisis between Russia and Europe, and the West in general, lies in the processes that run deep in the Old World.
The European project, hitherto seemingly successful and succeeding, which had allowed Europe to become the most comfortable and humane place to live in the world and an example of post-historical world order, plunged into a deep crisis last seven, eight or ten years. It still attracts people from poor countries, such as Ukraine, but their numbers will decline. Faced with multiple crises, Europe is losing its magnetism for Russia too and may become more of a problem than solution.
It would not be polite to mention the neighbor’s problems amid sagging political relations, for it would certainly look like gloating, but it cannot be avoided.
The main causes and signs of the crisis are as follows:
- The majority of EU countries are losing competitiveness to rising “new centers,” partly because of the critical condition of unreformed and overly costly social welfare systems. Most countries, except Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden, failed to carry out necessary reforms in the 1990s-2000s;
- Excessive EU enlargement, driven by political euphoria, to countries with different economic systems and cultures or less developed than the “core” EU nations; a disproportionate shift towards the European “south;”
- A politically-motivated transition to the euro without actually creating a federal and unified economic management system, thus making the current crisis inevitable;
- Politicization of the European Union where political logic prevailed over economic imperatives; to many the European Union began to look less and less profitable;
- Abortive attempts to develop a common foreign and defense policy tied up great European powers and reduced, rather than increased, the European Union’s political influence in international affairs. Many pluses produced a minus. This policy started working for the first time only when it was put on the old track of confrontation with Russia. But it is faltering and will keep faltering. Almost any attempt to pursue a constructive policy will definitely be obstructed by Poland, Baltic countries and the United States that backs them;
- The deficit of democracy in Europe, alienation of the elites from people, and the inability of the European establishment to explain the logic of its actions to people;
- The policy of multiculturalism and openness to immigration has failed;
- The geopolitical situation at the fringes of Europe and in the world in general has deteriorated immensely, leaving the EU unable to cope with it structurally or institutionally. The world is moving from the liberal multilateral world order, which underlies the EU’s foreign policy philosophy, to renationalization and reliance on force. (European elites’ strong reaction to Russia’s policy in Ukraine came largely as a response to the blow suffered by the EU’s concept of Europe and the world);
- And finally, and probably most importantly, the end of confrontation. European integration was based on two pillars prevention of a new war and curbing the spread of Soviet influence and communism. Once these goals were adhered, the EU lost the most essential purpose of its existence. European elites are now trying, intentionally or not, to fill this void.
As crisis situations mount, the European Union becomes an increasingly difficult and unpredictable partner. But more importantly, inability to cope with them is pressing European elites into looking for the bygone unifying factor – external threat – in order to use the gained unity for solving internal problems. But internal weakness also prompts these elites to rely once again on the United States, still powerful but withdrawing from Europe. And this gives additional trump cards to Washington which is still interested, for the time being at least, in whipping up confrontation and deepening the division of Europe.
Theoretically, the European issue can be solved through federalization and de facto creation of the United States of Europe. In reality, however, objective obstacles and cumulative errors make this scenario less feasible than a continual or even deeper crisis.
At this point I see no chance for Europe as it is today to reassume the role it played over the past two decades, when it expanded the zone of its economic, legal and political influence and control, or its “empire,” as it was called by skeptics, or its area of “democracy and law,” as it was called by European optimists. The potential for expansion, Brussels’ main instrument, has been exhausted. The offer made to Ukraine partly out of thoughtlessness and partly in a bid to shore up the vitality of the project in its own eyes and the eyes of the rest of the world may become its “swan song.” At least this explains the exasperation of European elites over the failure of their Ukrainian gambit.
The shared interest in creating and maintaining tensions and contrariety of values are all too plain to see. On top of that, mutual economic interests are waning because of systemic stagnation both in Russia and the majority of EU countries.
These numerous factors have brought about a dramatic decline in mutual trust, unprecedented since tensions began to subside in Europe some 40-50 years ago. The advance of new digital technologies and the slackening of moral standards in politics have created an information background that never existed even in the closing years of the Cold War when lies were not so massive and brazen, and neither politicians nor their mass media insulted the leaders of opposing countries.
If extraterrestrials got a chance to read and watch media flows dealing with foreign policy, negative for the most part and completely negative with regard to Russia, they would decide that the sides are psychologically preparing for war. I hope it is not so. But this kind of reporting amid growing mistrust makes the risk of accidental escalation increasingly probable. It is becoming politically perilous to make concessions and look for compromises.
But a compromise is needed. Most Europeans do not want a new confrontation which may on top of it all trigger a military and political escalation. Neither do Russians, I hope. In fact, the first two years of the new standoff showed that confrontation cannot overcome internal gridlocks.
The search for ways to ease tensions is also feasible as the sides have actually achieved much of what they aimed at. Russia sought to teach partners to respect its interests by force since peaceful persuasion did not work. It is disliked even more now, but I think it is also respected more. The West wanted to show that it was not “a paper tiger” and could inflict serious damage. It succeeded in doing so, and the falling oil prices helped it.
One thing is clear: Europeans should not tread old paths in search for a way out. They have proven wrong both in the East and in the West as Europeans missed, through folly, greed or weakness, a unique opportunity after the end of the Cold War to build a lasting and fair world order in “Greater Europe” of which the best European minds dreamt for centuries.
Searching for solutions
Given the pessimistic assessments made above, even discussing ways to end the current crisis would look like day-dreaming. But, firstly, all crises end sooner or later – either with a settlement or a war. A big war is unlikely since the sobering nuclear factor is still there. And yet it would be irresponsible to ignore such a possibility completely. Secondly, the search is underway and may lead to another dead-end or even make things worse. Thirdly, no one in Europe, except for a certain part of Brits, and anti-Russian-minded Poles and Balts, wants confrontation. Germans, who are fanning it to boost their leadership in the crumbling European project, are aware of its heavy long-term consequences for their positions. Whereas Russia has a Eurasian alternative, albeit somewhat, Europe and, above all, Germany will find it even harder to defend their interests in the world without the Eastern vector. Fourthly, even the United States, where confrontational views prevail at the moment, will most likely change its stance in the long term. The course of these and other changes can and should be influenced. Fifthly, and most importantly, Russia does not need long confrontation for both spiritual/historical reasons, mentioned above, and financial ones. It is always rewarding to have normal, or better still good, relations with one’s neighbors, especially those who in all probability will account if not for the biggest part of Russia’s foreign trade as before but certainly for its significant share.
Sixthly, and finally, if there is a new fight going on for Europe, it would be ridiculous not to join it, using peaceful methods, of course, and to lose the initiative to the competitors if not opponents. The last two decades have shown that appeasing or hit-or-miss tactics do not work.
There are four possible options to consider at the moment (apart from the completely unacceptable military one). The first one can be called Baltic-American. It recreates structural military-political confrontation east of the previous frontline.
This scenario is already underway with armaments being moved towards the border with Russia and military activity rising. It means that the fight for Ukraine will continue “to the last Ukrainian.” This is a bad plot for Russia, and the other side knows it. This is going to be a scenario of permanent instability similar to that in 1914 or, at best, in the late 1940-1950s, with constant brinksmanship of war.
Structural confrontation is always accompanied by calls to begin or resume nuclear and conventional arms reduction talks to make it less dangerous and at the same time deeper as such negotiations are a time-tested, albeit unrecognized, means to remilitarize politics and thinking.
The second scenario, proposed by Russia to create a Union of Europe, a common human and economic space from Vladivostok to Lisbon, does not look realistic any more, unfortunately. Reviving this scenario would be unlikely because of the almost complete lack of trust and because of the sanctions that will undermine trust in Europe as a reliable partner. Nor do I see any prospects for the soft version of a common economic space, also proposed by Russia, through dialogue and integration between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union. At first Brussels flatly refused to discuss it and even put Ukraine in a them-or-us dilemma. It took a disaster for them to start discussing it. But it cannot be implemented. No matter how hard it may try, Brussels will not be able to achieve consensus with Poland, Great Britain and the Baltic States. Any negotiations without it would be senseless.
Besides, Russia’s economic and political orientation has changed drastically from predominantly European to Eurasian. And there is no going back. At best, it could, and should, be a combination of the two vectors.
Meanwhile, continental Europeans, Russian traditionalists and some diplomats are discussing a third option that can be tentatively called “OSCE plus.” It calls for reviving the OSCE’s political role, although it remains a mystery how this can be done after two decades of emasculation, for increasing its budget, creating a permanent anti-crisis management center and an armed peacekeeping force, adopting its charter and giving a legal status to the organization and broader rights to its secretary-general.
This scenario can be acceptable for a certain transitional period, if it grants permanent neutrality to Ukraine and other countries in the “gray zone” involved in the geopolitical struggle as targets.
But it definitely cannot solve the problem. The OSCE has a heavy institutional tradition and was designed to serve the purpose of confrontation. When the latter formally ended, the organization became one of the few hotbeds that kept its flames by trading recriminations over breaches of its principles.
Set out in the Helsinki Act of 1975 and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 1990 and adopted when it seemed that Europe would become not only united but also politically homogeneous, these principles have become hopelessly obsolete. Reading these “commandments,” violated many times by everyone, makes one feel embarrassed. But the proponents of the “OSCE plus” option obstinately insist on them. It is not clear how to handle this situation. But the organization cannot last long on the principles everyone breaks. Hypocrisy can help in foreign policy sometimes, but it cannot be its foundation. And yet, reinvigorating the OSCE, even though formally, and working out new military-political confidence-building measures can help win time for a while in order to break out of the psychological and political confrontation.
But this cannot provide a long-term solution, which probably could be found in building or rebuilding old/new rules of the game.
When no solution can be found within a given framework, one has to look beyond it. Accumulated errors, mistrust, inertia of bureaucracies and failure of institutions fighting for existence, and – most importantly – new geopolitical realities necessitate going beyond the old European framework. There is also an another objective reason for that. Russia is qualitatively strengthening the Asian and Eurasian vector of its policy. China has announced the Silk Road Economic Belt policy and is going westward. Europe will not be able to develop effectively without Eurasian markets. The main challenges to European security – a new split and destabilization across the Middle East – cannot be countered without close cooperation with China, Russia and other Eurasian countries.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is taking on new members. Central Asia is building a new center of economic and logistics development. And this may as well lead to the emergence Community of Greater Eurasia in the future. This requires and makes it possible the creation of a political security infrastructure for this macro-region, possibly through establishing a Eurasian cooperation, development and security forum as the first step, a modern version of the Congress of Vienna, that would also invite countries from the western part of Eurasia to join in, and place the issue of European security in a broader context. In the past, unable to solve their security problems on their own, Europeans turned for help to the United States.
When a superpower, the Soviet Union, fell out of that system, and no responsible policy was put in place to make up for this loss, a crisis broke out. If balanced by China and other Eurasian countries, this system can become more stable.
Ideally, the emerging Eurasian community and the weakening Euro-Atlantic community could be complemented with a Pacific one, which was proposed by Henry Kissinger in his book “On China” several years ago. The United States has so far refused to follow its advice of its genius and instead has been creating a system of containments in the region, while at the same time reviving the military-political division of Europe. But the point of no return has not been passed yet. The interwoven Eurasian, Euro-Atlantic and Pacific communities will create prerequisites for relatively harmonious development the modern world needs so badly today.
When the idea of addressing the European security issue in the Eurasian context was proposed several months ago, it was rejected or strongly opposed. Now it is discussed more and more often and has actually become popular. So I remain an optimist.
This is a translation of the article, which was published in Russian in Mezdunarodnaya Zhizn magazine, September 2015