Sergei A. KaraganovNational Research University–Higher School of Economics Faculty of World Economics and International Affairs Academic Supervisor;Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Russia Honorary Chairman of the Presidium
26.09.2022 Interviewer: Artyom Kobzev
The territory of Ukraine is a scene of the West’s merciless crusade against Russia. While for the West it is a question of the survival of the current elites, for Moscow the stakes in this battle are far higher: it is a matter of the country’s survival. In order to win, Russia and its people must realize the gravity of the situation and the fact that there was not the slightest chance of avoiding this conflict. Sergei Karaganov, Academic Supervisor of the HSE Department of World Economics and International Affairs, Honorary Chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP), has shared his thoughts on this score in an interview to Profil magazine.
A. K. There is a problem rooted back to 2014. Many still do not understand the causes of the conflict with Ukraine. The evasive way that the goals of the special operation were described in―“denazification” and “demilitarization”―did not add clarity either. How can all this be explained to an average person, who has a vague idea of international relations?
S. K. It all started not in 2014, of course, but twenty-five years ago with the expansion of NATO. Russia then failed to offer resistance―mainly because it was weak, but also because it was trusting the words of Westerns. Even then some experts, including myself, warned that sooner or later Ukraine would be put on line and a war there would flare up. My fellow experts at the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy stated this unequivocally in our reports.
Then, in 1997, Moscow, still too weak and indulged in illusions about the decency of the West, signed the Russia-NATO Founding Act, which in fact legitimized the further expansion of the alliance.
This expansion continued slowly but surely throughout the subsequent years. In 2008, President George W. Bush, acting secretly from his allies, decided to fast-track Ukraine’s accession to NATO. When the French and the Germans learned the news―as far as I understand, from us―they were literally stunned and eventually blocked this plan. But then, at the insistence of the United States, Ukraine was promised that one day it would become a member of this bloc. And it certainly would have―sooner or later.
Given the composition of Ukraine’s population and the fact that it was possible to create a state there only on an anti-Russia ideological foundation, we faced the prospect of having a hostile country as our near neighbor. Moreover, a country affiliated with a bloc hostile to us, already notorious for several wars of aggression. Alas, for a very long time we preferred not to think about it, hoping for our good fortune. However, in reality, everything was predetermined back in 2004-2008, when a new Cold War started and Ukraine began to be pulled towards the West. So, it is incorrect to describe 2014 as a turning point.
That year could have become so, had we not only regained Crimea, but also firmly supported the uprising in eastern Ukraine.
But then we lacked either the determination or the strength to do so. I personally was deeply frustrated about that. In subsequent years, Ukraine was turned into an instrument of constant military-political pressure on Russia, regardless of what kind of regime was at the helm of power in Kiev and what was happening there in general. That country was converted to a military-political dagger aimed directly at the heart of Russia. In short, the question was not whether a crisis would happen or not, but when it would happen and what scenario it would follow.
A. K. Ukraine has not been allowed into NATO. But Finland and Sweden are joining the alliance instead…
S. K. The way I see it, we were late in the game to start acting. We should have done it much earlier. For the past five to eight years the West has conducted not just ordinary anti-Russian propaganda. It has been a military propaganda campaign. This type of brainwashing was essential for handling internal problems―the Western elites had failed on all tracks. They needed an enemy image. In 2012, I ordered a content analysis of the Western press―there was not a single positive publication about Russia! And that was at a time when our relationship still looked more or less decent.
A. K. In a 2018 interview, you said: “Another new Cold War meets the deep needs of the EU countries’ societies and, to an even greater extent, of their ruling classes.” Is this postulate still relevant?
S. K. Absolutely. The European ruling class has since suffered still worse failures and therefore been forced to escalate the anti-Russian and anti-Chinese hysteria.
Moreover, that hysteria has reached a degree not seen even in the 1950s!
There are some other reasons for the current aggravation as well. Russia’s strike on Ukraine has buried the hopes of European elites, who thought that their countries would always live in peace and calm, hiding from all big problems under the U.S. security umbrella and caring little about defense preparations and strategic matters, if at all.
A. K. Since the quality of the Western elites has proven to be that low, is there any chance that the ongoing economic crisis will lead to their renewal?
S. K. In all likelihood it will. Undoubtedly, the current crisis―and it is not only economic, but also political and social―will result in the elite’s renewal. This is what they fear the most! Western elites, as I have already said, have failed on all tracks and now they are desperately struggling for survival. I believe that the change of elites will take place in three or four electoral cycles from now, that is, in one generation’s lifetime. This will not be possible in the near future, so it would be wrong to try to build one’s policy on the assumption that completely different people will soon take over in the West.
A. K. And what is happening to our own elite now?
S. K. We are witnessing drastic acceleration of its nationalization. Pro-Western, comprador people and sentiment are being swept away. The mentality of the Russian elite is changing. Also, we are beginning to understand that Western capitalism and democracy and the Western world we had once cherished to join have turned out to be an illusion. We had a wrong vision of them.
We had a wrong vision of the world.
To excuse ourselves we can only say that for seventy years we lived in an environment of Soviet unanimity, which generated ignorance and feebleness of mind. This explains why our picture of the world turned out to be erroneous. But we have learned our lessons well and now we understand the world much better. As is known, failure teaches success.
A. K. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu has stated bluntly: “We are at war not so much with Ukraine as with the collective West.” Does such a clear designation of the West as an adversary change anything?
S. K. Shoigu stated the obvious. Many of my colleagues and I have been talking about this for a long time. Ukraine is just a tiny detail in a vast picture of changes afoot in the world. The West has ruled the roost for five hundred years. Now the balance of power is drifting away from it towards what is often called the non-West, but which my CFDP colleagues and I prefer to call the World Majority. This is the most important process. And the second most important one is the struggle of the West specifically with Russia and China. Our country is seen as a more vulnerable member of this duo, so the main blow is directed against us, its ultimate goal being to lay bare and weaken China. Let me say once again, Ukraine is only one of the theaters of war.
Of course, it is very important to us, but on the global scale, and for the West itself, it plays a secondary role.
However, this surely does not mean that we can afford to lose in Ukraine. We need to take this military operation more seriously. As we are at war with the collective West, good enough measures must be taken to make it lose the desire to go on fighting.
A. K. Strictly speaking, why can’t we afford to lose? And can the West afford to lose?
S. K. For us, it is a matter of the country’s survival, while for the West it is a matter of the survival of its current elites. This gives us a moral and psychological advantage. But in order to use this advantage properly there must be a clear understanding of the nature of what is happening in Ukraine.
A. K. In other words, you approve of the decision to start the mobilization campaign, don’t you?
S. K. This step was inevitable. Had the corresponding decision been taken earlier, the conflict in Ukraine would have probably ended faster, and many casualties could have been avoided. At the same time, I perfectly understand the reluctance of some fellow citizens to go to fight a war the meaning of which is not very clear to them. Or to send their sons to fight. But this will have to be done to ensure that no war should begin on our soil and there should be no need to use nuclear weapons. Although this terrible scenario cannot be ruled out altogether. One more remark.
When people like me were calling for the mobilization of society for a really big conflict, we were also insisting that all this should be unequivocally called a Fourth Patriotic War.
The first one was in 1812. The second, in 1914-1918. The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 was the third. The West is fighting furiously with us on the territory of Ukraine. The sooner we understand that this is precisely a Patriotic War, the better for us. We have been delaying mobilization, including industrial and mental, for too long.
A. K. In his address, Vladimir Putin said: “To protect Russia and our people, we will certainly use all means at our disposal.” It was an allusion to nuclear weapons. Moreover, the president stressed: “This is not a bluff.” How big is the risk that nuclear weapons may be used now?
S. K. For seventy years nuclear weapons served as a guarantor of peace. But, unfortunately, now we have found ourselves in a situation that can be described as “strategic parasitism.” Everybody has got accustomed to peace. Everybody is certain there can be no big war. But this is not so. Firstly, it can happen. And secondly, now the probability of nuclear weapons being used is greater than ever since the Cuban missile crisis. But I really hope it will not come to that. This is a straight road to hell. Many, of course, need a reminder what inferno is in the religious sense and what kind of inferno there was in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Our adversaries must realize that they have put themselves and the world on the brink of inferno.
A. K. What conclusions are the Chinese deriving from what is happening in relations between Russia and the West?
S. K. The Chinese have unambiguously taken our side. They are well aware that Russia’s defeat will result in a qualitative deterioration in China’s position. Therefore, they will be helping us more or less openly. But we must also understand: above all, they naturally care about their own interests, and not about ours.
A. K. The other day, Biden for the first time explicitly promised that the U.S. military would defend Taiwan if Beijing tried to gain control of the island by force. Should his words be taken seriously?
S. K. Biden can feel safe enough while making such statements because he knows that for the next two or three years, Beijing will not try to restore its jurisdiction over Taiwan by force. On the mainland they are building up muscle. Biden’s promise is empty talk.
A. K. And to what extent are the Americans ready to get involved in a conflict with Russia?
S. K. When Biden was asked the other day about the use of nuclear weapons in Europe, he replied that Russia would become a pariah and that some terrible consequences were in store for it. But he did not say that the U.S. would strike back at Russia. My knowledge of the history of U.S. nuclear strategy prompts me that one can be 99 percent certain that if there is a nuclear strike against one of the European countries supporting Ukraine, the United States will not use nuclear weapons. True, the 1-percent probability still remains, and it means hundreds of thousands of victims in our country and a possible escalation towards a universal thermonuclear war.
The psychological barrier that has so far kept humanity secure from big wars will be broken. Therefore, we must do our utmost not to let this happen.
But I do not rule out that the need for using nuclear weapons will emerge. The current Western elite is not in its right mind. There are enough signs of this. Suffice it to recall that it is waging a war on the borders, within the zone of fundamental and vital interests of a great nuclear power. In the last Cold War, this was unthinkable.– In what situation can the Americans still use nuclear weapons?
A. K. They will retaliate with a nuclear strike against Russia’s limited use of nuclear weapons only if there is a lunatic in the White House. Or someone who hates America and is ready to sacrifice, say, Boston for the sake of Poznan.
S. K. What side will ultimately benefit more from the Ukraine crisis―the United States, which has tied Europe to itself, or China, which has done the same in relation to Russia?
A. K. China may win big. The U.S. may make major gains, too, but by and large everyone is bound to lose because the whole system is crumbling. Ultimately, perhaps, everything will turn out for the better, including for Russia, as the world will be reorganized. But for now, it seems that everyone is bound to lose.
A. K. You have repeatedly said that the absence of the need to support former Soviet Union republics and friendly states is an important advantage Russia enjoys today, in contrast to the Soviet Union. But won’t the need for maintaining the newly-incorporated territories devalue this advantage?
S. K. I find this very worrisome. In the media and in all sorts of analytical memos I have repeatedly opposed the complete occupation of Ukraine. Ukraine in the Soviet Union was the largest recipient of direct and indirect subsidies, de facto from Russia (the RSFSR). Do we need the same again? True, the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine provided 75 percent of the country’s GNP. But now they are badly damaged. So, in any case, we will have to pay for our historical choice. Another problem to be borne in mind is this: we are spending resources (human, financial and many other) on the Ukrainian operation, instead of investing in the development of more promising areas, such as Siberia and the Far East. But the geopolitical situation in which we have found ourselves was not our choice. The West has dragged us into it. We will have to help restore the liberated lands. The people there are our people. Besides, Ukraine’s best human resources are in the east and the south of the country.
The interview was originally published in Russian in Profil weekly, 26.09./2022